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The Regulation of Mutual Fund Names and the Societal Role
of Trust: An Exploration of Section 35(d) of the
Investment Company Act
Larry D. Barnett*
ABSTRACT
Section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act ("the Act") autho-
rizes the Securities and Exchange Commission ("the SEC" or "the
Commission") to regulate the names of investment companies that are
registered with the Commission, and bars registered investment com-
panies - the vast majority of which are mutual funds - from using
names that contain words "that the Commission finds are materially
deceptive or misleading." This article relates the regulation of invest-
ment company names to the importance to society of trust. Pertinent
case law under section 35(d) is reviewed and Rule 35d-1 is discussed.
This article also considers fund names that are not covered either by
section 35(d) or by Rule 35d-1 - specifically, names that are 'cute' or
'catchy' - and suggests a possible revision of the section. The sug-
gested revision employs a behavioral science, value-neutral approach
to fund names rather than the present value-based approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
"In real life, unlike in Shakespeare, the sweetness of the rose depends
upon the name it bears. Things are not only what they are. They are, in
very important respects, what they seem to be."1
Structurally, a name is a spoken sound - and, in all but preliterate
societies, a set of written characters - that labels a tangible or intan-
gible referent. The importance of a name stems not from its structure,
however, but from its effect on social life. Functionally, a name chan-
nels perceptions of that which it labels and thereby characterizes its
referent;2 as a result, a name molds the behavior of the persons who
* Professor, School of Law (Delaware), Widener University. Postal Address: P.O. Box 7474,
Wilmington, DE 19803-0974; e-mail address: ldbarnett@widener.edu.
1. Hubert H. Humphrey, quoted in COLE'S QUOTABLES, The Quotations Page, at http://www.
quotationspage.com/Hubert H. Humphrey (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
2. BENJAMIN LEE WHORE, The Punctual and Segmentative Aspects of Verbs in Hopi, 12 LAN-
GUAGE 127 (1936), reprinted in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 51 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956) [hereinafter LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND
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use it.3 At the same time, a name is not inevitably linked to a particu-
lar referent; a name and its referent are brought together by the social
system employing the name.4 Even after the link is established and a
name has a meaning, moreover, the referent of a name - especially in
a society that is economically complex and culturally heterogeneous
- can be imprecise, may differ subtly from one subculture to another
within a social system, and can shift over time.5 The meaning of a
name is thus neither predetermined nor constant across space and
time. As the United States Supreme Court long ago observed, "[a]
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged[;] it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used."'6
As creations of society, names and their significations are an essen-
tial aspect of person-to-person communication, and like all tools that
contribute to the operation of a social system, names have a sociologi-
cal character. The failure to recognize and appreciate this character
can damage not just the credibility of the persons who promote and
use a name, but in some circumstances can also injure the very core of
society. Names are accordingly important to a social system, and their
sociological nature cannot be ignored by law.
The present article is based on two related sociological propositions.
They are that (1) the functioning of a society depends in part on the
extent to which its language is employed to facilitate or impair trust in
interpersonal relationships and (2) in situations where language is
used in a manner that reduces trust, the law of the society will, if infor-
mal mechanisms prove inadequate, adopt prescriptions and proscrip-
tions to guard against these misuses of language. More generally, this
REALITY]. "We are inclined to think of language simply as a technique of expression, and not to
realize that language first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory
experience which results in a certain world-order .... " Id., in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND
REALITY, at 55. See Benjamin Lee Whorf, An American Indian Model of the Universe, reprinted
in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra, at 57 (unlike English, the Hopi language con-
tains no word for 'time,' and users of the Hopi language therefore have "no general notion or
intuition of 'time' as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at
an equal rate, out of a future, through a present, into a past").
3. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language, in
LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY 75 (Leslie Spier ed., 1941), reprinted in LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 2, at 134.
4. Leslie A. White, The Symbol: The Origin and Basis of Human Behavior, reprinted in LAN-
GUAGE, MEANING AND MATURITY 252 (S. I. Hayakawa ed., 1954).
5. See LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. E. M. Anscombe trans.,
Macmillan 3d ed., Blackwell Publishing 2001) (1973). Cf Augustine Ihator, Understanding the
Cultural Patterns of the World - An Imperative in Implementing Strategic International PR Pro-
grams, 45 PUB. REL. 0. 38 (2000).
6. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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article advances the thesis that, as an integral component of society,
law protects and promotes societal equilibrium. Colloquially stated,
law is a servant, not a master, of society. As a consequence, language
and its names become subjects of government regulation in some
contexts.
Though the two propositions that underlie this article may seem ab-
stract and esoteric, they are of distinct practical importance. This arti-
cle applies the propositions to the names of mutual funds -
specifically, the treatment of fund names by the Investment Company
Act 7 and the regulation of fund names under the Act by the SEC. The
topic merits attention because nearly half of all households in the
United States have an investment in an open-end mutual fund8 and
because the names of mutual funds are believed capable of influenc-
ing potential investors. 9
If mutual fund names are able to have a substantial effect on inves-
tors, names that are seriously misleading can cause considerable dam-
age to the public welfare. The extent of the potential damage is
suggested by a 1996 survey of a national sample of individuals who
were investment decision-makers in their households and had per-
sonal investments in securities (either directly or through mutual
funds or participant-directed retirement plans). The survey, which
was sponsored by an organization of state securities regulators, con-
cluded that only one in five of the decision-makers was "very knowl-
edgeable" regarding investment-related subjects,10 indicating that a
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 - 64 (2000).
8. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 80 (44th ed., 2004) [herein-
after MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK], available at http://www.ici.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). The
term 'open-end' fund is defined in the text accompanying note 20 infra.
Among households with an investment in an open-end fund in 2004, the median number of
funds owned was four. Two-thirds of these households held a fund outside, and almost two-
thirds (63%) held a fund inside, an employer-sponsored defined-contribution retirement plan.
Id. at 82 (preliminary data). The preceding percentages add to more than one-hundred, because
some households owned funds in both ways, i.e., apart from a retirement plan and through a
retirement plan.
9. Investment Company Names, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24828. 66 Fed.
Reg. 8509, 8510 (Feb. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Release No. IC-24828].
It was not until 2003, however, that the impact of fund names on investors was the subject of a
well-designed empirical study. The study is discussed in part Ill-a below on Empirical Research
on the Impact of Fund Names.
10. Princeton Survey Research Associates, The Investor Protection Trust Investor Knowledge
Survey: A Report on the Findings 9 (April 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author). Investors were deemed "very knowledgeable" if they correctly answered at least seven
of eight questions that were designed to measure knowledge relevant to investing. Id. at 7.
Among investors who had a personal (as opposed to a retirement plan) account in a mutual
fund, approximately one out of four was judged "very knowledgeable," a somewhat higher per-
centage than among all investors who were interviewed. Id. at 10.
2005]
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large segment of the population is susceptible to manipulation when
investing in securities. The implications of the study were portrayed
as follows:
This data suggest that millions of investors, particularly women
and older investors, are 'sitting ducks' for investment fraud and
abuse. These are not encouraging findings for a society that is mov-
ing increasingly to a 'self-serve' approach to personal finance. Bet-
ter-informed decision-making is going to be critically important as
Americans find themselves confronted with more and more choices
they must make about major money matters, such as the investment
of retirement savings.11
The last sentence merits elaboration. Investments in mutual funds
represent fully one-fifth of the assets accumulated by Americans for
retirement (e.g., through employer-sponsored pension plans, Individ-
ual Retirement Accounts, and personally funded annuities).' 2 If most
individuals who own securities are unsophisticated about such invest-
ments, the manipulation of fund investors - through inter alia the
names of funds - can put at risk a significant portion of the wealth on
which Americans will rely for retirement. The regulation of fund
names under section 35(d) of the Act is a means to combat this
manipulation.
II. THE NATURE AND GROWTH OF MUTUAL FUND
A mutual fund is a relatively simple concept: A group of investors
pool assets and delegate to a person (i.e., an investment adviser) the
task of managing these assets pursuant to a contract requiring that the
assets be devoted to the acquisition - and, when appropriate, the
disposition - of securities. The typical mutual fund in the United
States is organized by its investment adviser and seeks investors from
the general population 13 - or at least the segment of the population
that has the economic resources permitting investments in securities.
The public nature of mutual funds, and the abuse of the trust of
Americans who bought the shares they issued, led Congress to adopt
two statutes in 194014: The Investment Company Act, which empow-
11. Press Release, Investor Protection Trust, Survey: Financial Illiteracy, Bad Habits, Danger-
ous Mix for Investors (May 14, 1996), http://www.investorprotection.org/upr/mission.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2005). The quoted comments were made by Mark Griffin, who was a trustee of
the organization sponsoring the study and director of the Division of Securities, Department of
Commerce, State of Utah.
12. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 85.
13. See Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir. 1988).
14. COMM. BANKING & CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S. REP. No. 1775 (76th Cong., 3d Sess.), at 3-4, 11 (1940).
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ers the SEC to regulate the funds, 15 and the Investment Advisers Act,
which empowers the Commission to regulate the persons responsible
for selecting the securities for the portfolios of the funds.16
The Act classifies mutual funds as one type of investment com-
pany,17 but mutual funds are by far the most popular type. 18 Specifi-
cally, a mutual fund is a management investment company,19 i.e., a
vehicle that issues and sells securities ("shares") to its investors, that
acquires securities with the assets derived from the purchase of its
shares, and that continuously applies its investment objectives and
strategies to its portfolio of securities. Two types of management
companies are distinguished by the Act: (1) management companies
issuing shares that the companies buy back at the request of their
shareholders ("open-end" funds) and (2) management companies is-
suing shares that, once sold by the companies to the public, can only
be traded by their beneficial owners in transactions effected with in-
vestors purchasing the shares ("closed-end" funds).20 Thus, the key
15. Ch. 686, title I, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.
(2000)).
16. Ch. 686, title II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq.
(2000)). The Investment Advisers Act covers a broad range of activities pertaining to securities
investments, one of which is advising investment companies. See the definition of investment
adviser at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2000).
17. If an investment vehicle is not an investment company, it is not a mutual fund. An invest-
ment vehicle that would be an investment company under § 3(a) of the Act is not deemed to be
an investment company if it satisfies the requirements of any one of the paragraphs of section
3(b) or section 3(c) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2000).
18. See infra note 20.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4 (2000).
20. As used in this article, the term 'mutual funds' includes both open-end funds and closed-
end funds.
In addition to mutual funds (i.e., management investment companies), unit investment trusts
and face-amount certificate companies are deemed to be investment companies by the Act. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-4 (2000). A unit investment trust has a specified termination date and issues to
each of its investors a security (i.e., a 'unit') that represents an interest in a largely unchanging
portfolio of equities or bonds. Investment Company Institute, Frequently Asked Questions
About Unit Investment Trusts, at http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs-uits.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2005). A face-amount certificate company issues to each of its investors a security (i.e., certifi-
cate) that constitutes a debt of the company to the investor; the investor makes regular payments
to the company until the security matures, at which time the investor receives the amount owed,
i.e., the face amount of the security. JOHN DOwNEs & JoRDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S
FINANCE & INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 302-303 (4th ed. 1995).
Few face-amount certificate companies appear to exist today. An indication of the rarity of
face-amount certificate companies is that no information on their number and assets is supplied
by the Investment Company Institute, which is the national association of investment companies
in the United States. Investment Company Institute, at http://www.ici.org/site-index.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2005). On the other hand, the Institute furnishes data on the number and assets
of mutual funds and of unit investment trusts: At the end of 2003, the market value of the net
assets of open-end mutual funds (including money market funds) was approximately $7.414 tril-
lion, the market value of the assets of closed-end mutual funds was approximately $214 billion,
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difference between open-end funds and closed-end funds is that
shares of the former are "redeemable '21 but shares of the latter are
not. However, while open-end funds are much more common than
closed-end funds,22 there appears to be no empirical evidence that the
name of a fund influences decisions to invest differently, or to a differ-
ent degree, when funds are open-end than when funds are closed-end.
As a result, this article examines the names of funds without drawing a
distinction between the two types of funds.23
Since its adoption in 1940, the Investment Company Act has au-
thorized regulation of the names of investment companies registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission,24 but such regulation
has become a more important matter over the last two decades be-
cause of the rapid rise in the number of funds: The numerical increase
in funds has seriatim enlarged the number of fund names, the poten-
tial variety of names, and the possible manipulation of investors by
fund names. The accompanying graph shows the increase in open-end
funds that invest in equities, in bonds or comparable fixed-income in-
struments, or in both.25 Such funds, which do not include money mar-
and the market value of the assets of unit investment trusts was approximately $36 billion. Mu-
TUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 107, 145, 146. The combined assets of open-end and
closed-end mutual funds thus exceeded the assets of unit investment trusts by a ratio of roughly
212 to 1.
'Exchange-traded funds' are also investment companies. They are so named because investors
sell and purchase fund shares on exchanges. The funds themselves sell and redeem their shares
just in large blocks. Exchange-traded funds are registered with the Commission either as open-
end funds or as unit investment trusts. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Commit-
tees, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-25885, 68 Fed. Reg. 2638, 2648 (Jan. 17, 2003).
Exchange-traded funds are excluded from the data used in this article. According to the Invest-
ment Company Institute, the first exchange-traded fund became available in January 1993; at the
end of 2003, there were 119 exchange-traded funds and the combined net assets of these funds
totaled approximately $151 billion. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 105; Invest-
ment Company Institute, Frequently Asked Questions About Exchange-Traded Funds, at http://
www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs-etfs.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(2000). A "redeemable security" is defined at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32)
(2000).
22. The Investment Company Institute reports data for the end of 2003 on 586 closed-end
funds, the assets of which totaled approximately $214 billion. The Institute reports data, for the
same time point, on 7,153 'long-term' open-end funds, i.e., open-end funds that invest in stocks,
in bonds or similar fixed-income securities, or in both and that are intended for long-term inves-
tors; the net assets of these open-end funds amounted to approximately $5.362 trillion. Calcu-
lated from MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 107, 109, 145.
23. If research were to establish that the effect of fund names on investment decisions de-
pends on whether the funds are open-end or closed-end, regulation of fund names will need to
vary with fund type.
24. Ch. 686, title I, § 35, 54 Stat. 840 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34
(2000)).
25. The data used in the graph are the number of 'long-term funds' in MUTUAL FUND FACT
BooK, supra note 8, at 109.
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ket funds, are designed for long-term investors and are likely to be the
most significant for the public welfare - and hence for law - since
their investors can suffer sizable losses. Closed-end funds are omitted
from the graph because their numbers are not available for all of the
years covered. 26 The number of closed-end funds is evidently quite
small, 27 however, and their omission is unlikely to alter the trend or
noticeably affect its magnitude.
0.
-190 19*73 1978 19,79 ig 2 1985 196 i9 1964 199T .2=0 2003
Year
Number of open-end funds for Ion g -term i nvestors(by year)
The number of open-end funds for long-term investors increased
from 361 in 1970 to 7,153 in 2003, but as the graph discloses, growth
was slow prior to the decade of the 1980s. Indeed, funds numbered
just 458 in 1980. Thereafter, the number began to expand rapidly: A
doubling occurred between 1980 and 1985 (from 458 to 1,068), an-
other doubling took place between 1985 and 1988 (from 1,068 to
2,127), and a further doubling occurred between 1988 and 1994 (from
2,127 to 4,362). Between 1994 and 2003, the number rose by another
three-fifths (from 4,362 to 7,153). Unquestionably, there has been
dramatic numerical growth since 1980 in open-end funds for long-term
investors, and fund names that are devised to attract investors to
funds have presumably increased as well.
26. See MUTUAL FUNDO FAcT BOOK, supra note 8 at 145.
As stated in note 20 supra, exchange-traded funds are also omitted from the graph.
27. See supra note 22.
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF FUND NAMES
But do fund names influence the decisions of investors? While it is
commonly thought that fund names matter, the question has been the
subject of just a single empirical study - a study that was completed
only in 2003.28 More than six decades have elapsed since the Act was
proposed and enacted, and during this time, both Congress and the
SEC have simply assumed that fund names are able to affect invest-
ment decisions to a meaningful degree. The assumption garners some
support from research in linguistics on the general influence of words
on behavior, 29 but until the recent study, there was no research that
tested the assumption with quantitative data and a rigorous statistical
technique.
a. Empirical Research on the Impact of Fund Names
Because of the uniqueness and quality of the study, its design as
well as its findings will be described. In the study, whether the names
of mutual funds affected the decisions of investors was investigated by
examining name changes that involved particular styles of investing in
equity securities. Specifically, name changes were studied when the
new fund names expressed either a value orientation or a growth ori-
entation to equities and/or when the new fund names expressed an
emphasis either on large capitalization issuers or on small capitaliza-
tion issuers of equities. The name changes were assessed in terms of
whether they followed and/or preceded shifts in monthly equity-fund
money flows during a period of approximately seven years (April 1994
through July 2001); to eliminate the role of factors that might be creat-
ing or masking a link between name changes and money flows, the
influence of a number of other variables was statistically removed.
Name changes, the investigators found, tended to follow shifts in the
flow of money into or out of the investment styles being studied: Af-
ter investors started to commit larger amounts of money to a given
equity investment style, equity funds became more likely to adopt
names that referred to the favored style, and after investors started to
commit smaller amounts of money to a given equity investment style,
equity funds became more likely to drop names that referred to the
disfavored style. In addition - and the relevant finding for purposes
of section 35(d)of the Act - investors rewarded these types of name
changes, whether or not the portfolio holdings of the funds conformed
28. P. Raghavendra Rau et al., Changing Names with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and
Their Effects on Fund Flows (Aug. 2003), J. FIN. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
29. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
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to their new names. To be exact, equity mutual funds whose new
names identified styles preferred by investors, and equity mutual
funds whose new names no longer identified styles disliked by inves-
tors, attracted approximately twenty-two percent more money over
the twelve months that followed their name changes than did match-
ing funds whose names remained the same.
It is important to note that the study, while groundbreaking, did not
answer a number of questions to which answers are necessary if we
are to ascertain whether section 35(d) is fulfilling its goal of protecting
investors. The study suggests that fund names can appreciably influ-
ence the volume of money moving into or out of mutual funds (or at
least funds that focus on equity securities),but research has yet to
identify the proportion and types of individuals who are influenced.
These questions could not be answered by the study, because the vari-
ables it measured were characteristics of funds and answers to the
questions require data on investors in funds. However, in order to
know whether section 35(d) should be amended by Congress and/or
whether rules should be adopted under the section by the SEC, empir-
ical research on the questions is required. In particular, research is
needed to determine (1) the percentage of individual investors who
alter the amounts they invest in mutual funds because of changes in
fund names; (2) the proportion of the securities investments owned by
individuals that are moved into or out of mutual funds because of
changes in fund names; (3) the demographic, social, and economic at-
tributes that differentiate individuals whose investment decisions are
affected by changes in fund names from individuals whose investment
decisions are unaffected; and (4) the impact of changes in fund names
on the decisions of individuals not only in terms of funds that invest in
equity securities but also in terms of funds that invest in debt
securities.
To locate evidence bearing on whether it should be assumed that
names of funds are important to a broad range of individual investors,
I undertook a search for relevant studies on other topics done in mar-
keting and in psychology. None of the studies I found in the field of
marketing was useful for determining whether the assumption is justi-
fied, mainly because these studies considered names of brands rather
than names of particular products. 30 In the field of psychology, how-
ever, one study is pertinent and furnishes evidence bolstering the as-
30. E.g., Merrie Brucks et al., Price and Brand Name as Indicators of Quality Dimensions for
Consumer Durables, 28 J. ACAD. MARKETING Sci. 359 (2000); Tulin Erdem & Michael P. Keane,
Decision-making Under Uncertainty: Capturing Dynamic Brand Choice Processes in Turbulent
Consumer Goods Markets, 15 MARKETING SCI. 1 (1996).
2005]
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sumption.31 The hypotheses of the study were tested with data from
undergraduate college students who, in two experiments that are rele-
vant to the present article, formulated rules to describe sets of pictures
that had been drawn by children. The pictures were grouped into sets,
and each set carried a label supplied by the researchers. Labels, how-
ever, varied between sets: Some labels specified a variable on which
the children-artists differed - e.g., "drawn by creative and noncrea-
tive children" - and hence could evoke the prior knowledge, includ-
ing the expectations, of the college students regarding the source of
the pictures. These labels shaped the students' perceptions of the pic-
tures they were describing. Other labels made no reference to the
attributes of the children-artists, but simply utilized a number (e.g.,
"group 1"). The latter labels thus carried no substantive connotations.
The experiments found that labels appreciably altered the manner
in which the pictures in a category were described: "[M]anipulating
prior knowledge by simply varying category labels has a profound in-
fluence on [the] rules" applied to the picture sets.32 More generally,
the interpretation of a stimulus was affected not only by the current
experiences of the individual exposed to the stimulus but also by her
or his psychological resources, and the psychological resources that
operated on the stimulus were influenced markedly by the words de-
picting the stimulus.
Unfortunately, the study utilized data from a small number of self-
selected individuals who were drawn form a limited population, 33 and
whether the findings of the study can be generalized to the population
as a whole is therefore unclear. Nonetheless, the results of the study
are consistent with other evidence (including evidence from linguis-
tics 34 ) that has been reviewed in this article: Empirical research, al-
though limited, supports the proposition that labels mold perceptions
and actions. If the proposition is correct, the names of mutual funds
can affect the behavior of most investors.
In short, although behavioral and social scientists have produced
just one study to date that has focused directly on the impact of fund
names, the available evidence consistently suggests that investors can
be swayed by fund names. This conclusion, however, raises a ques-
31. Edward J. Wisniewski & Douglas L. Medin, On the Interaction of Theory and Data in
Concept Learning, 18 COGNITIVE Sci. 221 (1994).
32. Id. at 229.
33. Both of the experiments summarized in the text were conducted with undergraduate stu-
dents at a single university. One experiment involved 124 undergraduates; the other experiment
involved 40 undergraduates. The students in the experiments were granted course credit for
their participation.
34. See the text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra.
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tion: If such an effect occurs, why does law need to impose restrictions
on fund names? On the surface, the question has an easy answer -
simply put, law advances notions of fairness, and fairness demands
that investors not be manipulated by fund names. Beneath the ques-
tion, however, is a matter that goes to the heart of the legal system.
Specifically, we must consider the elements that comprise the founda-
tion of law in a society. The failure to recognize and appreciate one
particular element - social capital - can jeopardize not only the ac-
ceptance by the citizenry of the legal system but imperil the very
fabric of society.
b. Trust and Government Regulation in Society
Societies possess and utilize social resources that are distinct from
the resources found in the characteristics of an individual (e.g., read-
ing skill and health). The resources of a society are thus not properties
of individuals even though individuals draw upon them. Rather, the
resources of a society belong to the society - i.e., the resources of a
society are properties of the society - and they inhere in the relation-
ships that exist among the members of the society. In sociology, the
resources of society have been denominated "social capital, '' 35 and
they differ in type and amount between countries.36
Because societal resources influence the manner in which the sub-
systems of society operate - i.e., because social capital affects how,
and how well, the components of a society function- research on so-
cial capital is pertinent to the present article. A society is unlikely to
have a prosperous financial system if the social capital of the society is
severely impaired. Indeed, one of the resources of a society - trust -
may be a causal factor in investment activity: The relative level of
investment in a country has been found by one study to respond di-
rectly to the level of trust among the residents of the country.37
While trust is a key component of social capital and the recognition
of trust as a significant feature of society is not recent in sociology, 38
only during the last half of the 1990s did sociologists begin to conduct
sophisticated quantitative research on trust. The following paragraphs
review some of this research. That only a limited number of well-
35. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc. S95
(1988).
36. RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFr IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 36-42, 64-65
(1990).
37. Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 Econ. J. 295, 307-11 (2001).
38. See J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 Soc. FORCES 967, 968
(1985).
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designed sociological studies of trust have been done is unfortunate,
because sociologists bring a unique perspective to trust in particular
and to social capital in general. The neglect of trust, however, is not
confined to sociology. Economists, too, have devoted relatively little
effort to the topic. 39
Given the insights that sociological research on trust may furnish,
two aspects of trust that have been investigated by sociologists are
reviewed here. Both aspects are pertinent to the regulation of invest-
ment companies. The first aspect is the interplay of three variables -
degree of commitment to small groups, level of social uncertainty (i.e.,
level of risk in dealing with other persons), and strength of trust. The
three variables, and the extent to which they affect each other, are of
interest, because all of the variables involve interpersonal relation-
ships and because social capital exists in such relationships. The
United States and Japan have been the focus of the research 40 since
these countries are characterized by markedly different patterns of so-
cial interaction: Social ties among the members of small groups (e.g.,
families) are stronger in Japan than in the United States, but trust in
other persons generally (i.e., generalized trust) is stronger in the
United States than in Japan. The two countries thus offer an opportu-
nity to examine the link, if any, that exists between small-group social
ties and generalized trust; to determine whether the link remains after
the influence of other variables is removed; and to identify factors that
act as antecedents of both. Logic suggests the existence of a perva-
sive, persistent link between social ties and generalized trust: Strong
interpersonal ties within small groups may hinder the development of
trust outside such groups. If so, the intensity of small-group ties will
be inversely related to the intensity of generalized trust.
Data from the United States and Japan indicate that, ceteris paribus,
the level of uncertainty faced by individuals is the antecedent of the
strength of social ties within small groups, i.e., an increase in the for-
mer generates an increase in the latter. In turn, the intensity of inter-
personal ties in small groups is inversely related, both as cause and as
effect, to the level of generalized trust: As small-group interpersonal
ties become stronger, ceteris paribus, the development of generalized
trust is impeded, but as generalized trust is intensified by (other)
39. Michael Perelman, The Neglected Economics of Trust, 57 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 381 (1998).
The study by Zak and Knack, supra note 37, does note appear to negate the general observa-
tion by Professor Perelman, whose article was published three years earlier.
40. Toshio Yamagishi et al. Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States
and Japan, 104 AM. J. Soc. 165 (1998).
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broad social forces and/or by particular historical events, small-group
interpersonal ties are needed less and are therefore not as common.
The preceding findings explain why a nation-state must act to curb
the exploitation of investors by, for example, regulating the names of
mutual funds. A society that does not protect investors from manipu-
lation can be expected to experience seriatim an increase in uncer-
tainty, an expansion of social ties within small groups, and a reduction
in the degree to which others in general are trusted. As small-group
ties in a society become more intense and pervasive, the cohesiveness
of society as a collective entity is weakened. A nation-state whose
economy requires a robust, society-wide financial system will thus find
that the exploitation of securities investors, by altering the organiza-
tion of social life, carries unacceptable consequences and cannot be
allowed to continue. In legal parlance, the public welfare is
threatened.
The second aspect of trust that has been investigated by sociologists
is whether the level of trust has changed among Americans during
recent decades. Two studies have reported a decrease in the extent to
which individuals are trusted. One study, relying on time-series data
for each of nine years from 1975 to 1994, found "a strong and consis-
tent decline" in a measure of whether individuals were trusted, but no
secular decline in whether four prominent societal institutions were
trusted.41 The second study, using data for eighteen years from 1972
to 1998, considered the joint impact of changes in age, in time period,
and in birth cohort (year of birth) on whether individuals were trusted
and concluded that an overall secular decline in trust had occurred.
The decline was attributed to the effect of shifts in the level of trust
(1) in successive birth cohorts beginning in the 1940s and/or (2) in
different age groups beginning in the 1980s.
42
If the secular reduction in generalized trust in other individuals is
not arrested, there may be long-lasting damage to the securities mar-
kets in the United States and, in turn, to the financial system of the
country. Every society undoubtedly needs at least a minimal level of
social capital if it is to be economically competitive, and presumably a
threshold exists below which a society starts to disintegrate. There-
fore, no society can afford to allow the trust of its members to wither
indefinitely, and in order to protect and promote social capital, a soci-
41. Pamela Paxton, Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator As-
sessment, 105 AM. J. SOC. 88, 121(1999). The four institutions were Congress, the education
system, the executive branch of the federal government, and organized religion.
42. Robert V. Robinson & Elton F. Jackson, Is Trust in Others Declining in America? An
Age-Period-Cohort Analysis, 30 Soc. Sci. RES. 117, 140 (2001).
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ety must curb the short-term, self-seeking behavior of individuals.
One means by which a society may be able to do so is through regula-
tion authorized by statute, and potential subjects of regulation include
securities and activities bearing on securities transactions.
IV. SECTION 35(D) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
The main statutory source for the regulation of names of mutual
funds is paragraph (d) of section 35 of the Act. Paragraph (a) of sec-
tion 35 of the Act requires that, in issuing or selling a security issued
by an investment company registered with the SEC, a person may not
assert or imply "in any manner whatsoever" - a phrase encompassing
a fund name 43 - that (1) the United States, its agencies or instrumen-
talities guarantee, sponsor, recommend or have approved either the
security or the investment company, (2) the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation insures the security or company, or (3) a bank or
insured depository institution guarantees or backs the security or com-
pany.44 However, paragraph (d) of section 35 is considerably broader
than paragraph (a); indeed, a portion of paragraph (a) is covered by a
rule adopted by the Commission under paragraph (d). 45 As a result, it
is paragraph (d) on which this article focuses.
Paragraph (d) of section 35 was amended in 199646 and is presently
worded as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company to adopt
as a part of the name or title of such company, or of any securities
of which it is the issuer, any word or words that the Commission
finds are materially deceptive or misleading. The Commission is au-
43. Government Securities Management Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 30, 1976), 1976
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 225. See In the Matter of Civil and Military Investors Mutual Fund, Inc.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 2723 [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 9[ 76,595, at 50,298 (June 9, 1958), available at 1958 SEC LEXIS 405; Generic Comment
Letter, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 25,1990), 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1413.
44. 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-34(a) (2002).
The text summarizes the current, not the original, wording of paragraph (a). The paragraph
was adopted in 1940 as part of the Investment Company Act; its current wording resulted from
an amendment of the paragraph in 1999 and became effective in May 2001. Ch. 686. title I, § 35,
54 Stat 840 (1940); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, title II, §§ 214, 225, 113 Stat.
1338, 1398, 1402 (1999). The ability of paragraph (a) to reach fund names was neither created
nor limited by the amendment, since from the time it was enacted the paragraph has prohibited
that which "in any manner whatsoever" suggests a registered investment company or a security
it issues is guaranteed, sponsored, recommended or approved by the United States or any agency
or officer of the United States.
45. See the text accompanying note 84 infra.
46. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.No. 104-290, § 208, 110
Stat. 3416, 3432. The amendment to section35(d) was effective in April 1997. Id. at § 210, 110
Stat. 3436.
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thorized, by rule, regulation, or order, to define such names or titles
as are materially deceptive or misleading.
47
As enacted in 1940, paragraph (d) prohibited registered investment
companies from employing names that the Commission concluded
were materially deceptive or misleading, but the Commission was re-
quired to issue an order declaring a name to be in violation of the
paragraph and, if the order was ignored by the party responsible for
the violation, to obtain a court injunction against continued use of the
name.48 The 1996 amendment of the paragraph removed the require-
ment that the Commission act on a case-by-case basis to suppress an
offending name, and empowered the Commission to implement the
paragraph with rules to which the names of registered investment
companies must conform.
One point worthy of mention is that neither the original version of
section 35(d) adopted in 1940 nor its 1996 amendment subjected the
name of an investment vehicle to regulation if the vehicle need not
register with the Commission. The Act designates the activities that
cause an investment vehicle to be an investment company and then
excludes from the status of investment company a list of investment
vehicles having particular attributes. 49 From its enactment in 1940,
section 35(d) has been limited to investment entities that are defined
as investment companies by the Act and that are therefore required to
be registered with the Commission.
Prior to the 1996 amendment, two categories of substantive actions
were taken by the Commission under section 35(d), and each will be
reviewed. The two categories are:
A. Decisions by the staff of the Commission on requests for no-
action letters, and rulings by the commissioners on applications,
dealing with the names of particular funds.
B. Positions of the staff on the portfolio composition of mutual
funds that have certain types of names.
As the two categories suggest, actions under section 35(d) are almost
entirely actions of the Commission, i.e., actions of the staff or the com-
missioners.50 Litigation by fund investors under section 35(d) is not
considered in this article because it is scarce: Section 35(d) does not
explicitly establish a private cause of action for shareholders of funds
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (2000).
48. Ch. 686, § 35(d), 54 Stat. 840 (1940).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2000).
50. No-action letters, although decisions by the staff and not binding on the commissioners,
are generally accepted as authoritative statements of Commission positions. Donna M. Nagy,
Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and
a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. Rnv. 921, 923-24 and 943 (1998).
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who are materially deceived or misled by the names of the funds, and
the courts have thus far been unwilling to hold that the section con-
tains an implicit private right of action,51 although a large body of ju-
dicial decisions on the question does not yet exist.
a. Names of Particular Funds
Before section 35(d) was amended in 1996, the names of specific
funds were the subject of decisions by the Commission staff in reply-
ing to requests for no-action letters and by the commissioners in ruling
on applications. We begin with these decisions and the two different
issues they involve: (i)the conditions under which section 35(d) is vio-
lated by a similarity in the names of two or more funds; (ii) the condi-
tions under which section 35(d) is violated by the connotation(s) of a
word or words in the name of a single fund.
If two or more funds have names that are the same or similar, the
funds may be confused with each other. When such confusion occurs,
the names will be materially misleading, and section 35(d) will be
breached. 52 The breach will be eliminated (or, in the case of a pro-
posed name, avoided) if the name is confined to one fund, namely, the
fund that possesses the prior and superior claim to the name. 53 In
Capital Liquidity, a no-action letter issued in 1975, the staff stated that
funds can "use the same generic terms in their names without violat-
ing [s]ection 35(d) provided that the words in the names appear in
different order or . .. there are other distinguishing words in the
names. ' 54 Thus, fund names are permitted to be similar when the sim-
51. Young v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp.2d 914, 928 (S.D. Tex. 1998). See also Olm-
sted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 434 (2nd Cir. 2002) (recent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court have reduced the latitude of lower federal courts to find an implicit pri-
vate cause of action in a statute).
In re Alliance North American Government Income Trust, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 95
Civ. 0330, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14209, at *9-11 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 26, 1996), involved a suit by
shareholders of a fund alleging inter alia that the name of the fund violated section 35(d). The
court rejected the claim that the name breached the section, but the issue of whether the section
authorized a private cause of action was not discussed; the court simply assumed that a private a
cause of action existed.
In limited circumstances, the name of a fund may violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act. Young v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., supra, at 919-22. Common-law
actions alleging fraud and/or negligence in the use of fund names also seem to be rare. See id. at
928.
52. In the Matter of Atomic, Chemical & Electronic Shares, Inc., Investment Company Act
Release No. 2,335 (April 6, 1956), 1956 SEC LEXIS 452; Government Securities Management
Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 30, 1976), 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 225.
53. In the Matter of Atomic-Electronics Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No.
2,076 (Dec. 30, 1954), 1954 SEC LEXIS 97.
54. Capital Liquidity, SEC No-Action Letter (March 28, 1975), 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
628, at *1.
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ilarity is the result of words that are "generic" but only (1) if the se-
quence of the generic words is not the same or (2) if the names are
differentiated by other words. Thus, the staff did not believe that sec-
tion 35(d) was breached by the names "Capital Liquidity" and "Liq-
uid Capital Income." In the view of the staff, the names employed
generic words - the concepts of "capital,' ''liquid," and "income" - in
a "particular context" that prevented the words from being deceptive
or misleading.55 The nature of the context was not specified, however.
In another case, the staff found acceptable the name "Kemper Income
and Capital Preservation Fund" even though the name "Capital Pres-
ervation Fund" was already in use. Both names employed a generic
term, viz., "capital preservation," but the staff approved the former
name because it contained words (viz., "Kemper Income and") that
distinguished it from the latter name.
56
Other cases have applied the principle that section 35(d) is
breached by name similarities that confuse investors, including name
similarities that cause investors to believe funds are associated with
one another. These cases furnish additional illustrations of similarities
that violate, and similarities that do not violate, section 35(d):
" Because the name "Minnesota Tax-Exempt Income Trust" was
already being used, the staff concluded that section 35(d) would
be breached by the name "Minnesota Tax-Exempt Bond Fund"
but not by the name "Tax Exempt Bond Fund for
Minnesotans."'5
7
" On their face, the names "Fund for U.S. Government Securities"
and "Fund for Government Investors" were acceptable to the
staff under section 35(d). The probability that, because of their
names, the funds would be confused with each other was evi-
dently believed to be very low.
58
All of the preceding decisions on name similarities were rendered in
the 1970s, and according to publicly available documents, the Com-
mission has taken no further action on this topic during the last quar-
ter of a century. However, the extent to which the staff has informally
resolved questions involving name similarities is unknown. While the
large increase in the number of equity and fixed-income funds during
the 1980s and 1990s may have overwhelmed the ability of the Com-
55. Id.
56. Bayrock and Kemper Funds, SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 21, 1974), 1974 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 847, at *1-2.
57. Minnesota Fund Management, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Marchl2, 1978), 1978 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 885; Minnesota Fund Management, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (April 15,
1978), 1978 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1289, at *1.
58. Fund for U.S. Government Securities, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (April 27, 1975), 1975
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 803, at *1.
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mission to deal with name similarities, the possibility also exists that
the Commission encountered relatively few problematic name similar-
ities - and could handle them informally - because the no-action let-
ters reviewed above furnished adequate guidance to funds in selecting
names that would avoid investor confusion. For example, under the
principles already identified, 59 two fund families are able to use the
phrase "Short-Term Corporate Bond" for individual funds without vi-
olating section 35(d) because the name of the fund family would ap-
pear in the name of its fund. Thus, fund family ABC would be
permitted to offer the "ABC Short-Term Corporate Bond Fund" and
fund family XYZ would be permitted to offer the "XYZ Short-Term
Corporate Bond Fund," since the two funds would be differentiated
by the name of the fund family.
We turn next to the names of individual funds that contain one or
more words the connotation(s) of which may cause the names to
breach section 35(d). Unfortunately, there is no recent statement and
explanation of the test to be applied. However, based on United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the Act, whether word con-
notations are materially deceptive or misleading is determined by the
likely effect of the connotations on the reader, and the intent of the
person choosing the word(s) as not pertinent. Specifically, a name
would be materially deceptive and misleading if, when used for a fund,
there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [person] would
consider it important in deciding" whether to invest in the fund and
would receive an incorrect impression of the nature of the fund.60 The
name need not be characterized by a substantial probability that it will
induce a reasonable person to invest. Rather, "a substantial likeli-
hood that, under all the circumstances, the [name] would have as-
sumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable"
investor will produce a violation of section 35(d) if the name is decep-
tive or misleading. 61 Thus, a name suggesting that a fund offers a par-
59. See Capital Liquidity, SEC No-Action Letter (March 28, 1975), 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
628, at *1, and the text accompanying note 54 supra.
60. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). According to the Court,
the standard of materiality involves an "objective" assessment of the meaning and weight of one
or more words to a reasonable investor. Id. at 445. Since investors' actual interpretations are
irrelevant, the test of materiality is not "subjective."
The Commission subsequently incorporated into the Securities Act the definition of material-
ity adopted by TSC Industries under the Securities Exchange Act. See Rule 405 at 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405(2004). Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383
(March 3, 1982), 1982 SEC LEXIS 2191.
61. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Accord, Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). Section 35(d) thus involves a two-part test: (1) whether the
fund name deceives or misleads; and (2) whether the deceptive or misleading effect of the name
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ticular advantage to a specific type of individual is unacceptable if the
advantage is not present.62 Moreover, the level of sophistication of
the potential investor must be considered in assessing the risk that a
word or words in a name will produce a misunderstanding.63 To illus-
trate, the name "National Retirement Planning Funds" was deemed
acceptable by the staff under section 35(d), because the investment
company bearing the name was marketed to entities (retirement
plans) possessing expertise in securities; however, the staff implied
that the name might not be acceptable if the investment company
were marketed to individuals in the public at large. 64 In addition, the
word "account" in the name of a money market fund entitled "Money
Market Account" was found not to violate section 35(d) on the
grounds that, because the nature of these funds was generally under-
stood, the word was unlikely to lead investors to believe they were
making a deposit in a bank or savings or loan association. 65 However,
other words have been found to violate section 35(d) because they
presented a danger that funds with these words in their names would
be confused with accounts at government-insured financial institu-
tions: The unacceptable words were "Mutual Savings" in the name
"CNA Mutual Savings Fund"; 66 the word "savings" in the name "Say-
is material, i.e., whether the fund name is likely to carry weight with a reasonable person in
reaching a decision on whether to invest in the fund.
The test in TSC Industries and in Basic supersedes the test in Civil and Military Investors
Mutual Fund, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch.Comm'n, 288 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In deciding whether a
fund name satisfied section 35(d), the court in the latter case examined what "the name in ques-
tion implies" and "the expectations raised by the name" and ruled that section 35(d) is violated
if the foregoing "may have a harmful tendency to mislead and deceive prospective investors." Id.
at 158. However, the court did not require "a substantial likelihood" the name be an important
consideration in the investment decision of a reasonable person.
In Liquidity Accounts, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 5,1974), 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
939, at *1, the staff asserted that "a substantial probability" existed the fund name in question
"would have a tendency" to mislead investors and hence concluded that section 35(d) would be
violated. The staff appears to have omitted the second part of the test under section 35(d), viz.,
that there be a substantial likelihood a reasonable person will assign weight to the name of the
fund when considering the fund as a possible investment.
62. Civil and Military Investors Mutual Fund, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 288 F.2d 156. 158
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
63. In the Matter of Civil and Military Investors Mutual Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act
Release No. 2723 [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,595, at 50,298,
50,299 (June 9. 1958), available at 1958 SEC LEXIS 405.
64. Nat'l Retirement Planning Funds, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 26, 1976), 1976 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 2160, at *1.
65. Mutual of Omaha Money Market Account, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 10, 1979),
1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3589, at *1-2.
66. CNA Money Instruments, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 29, 1974), 1974 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 899.
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ings and Equity Mutual Fund"; 67 the word "thrift" in the name "Ben
Franklin Thrift Shares"; 68 the word "savest," which blended "save"
and "invest" but which the staff thought signified "safest" and a gov-
ernment-protected savings account;69 and the words "insured" or
"guaranteed" together with the words "United States" or "U.S. Gov-
ernment," because a combination of the former and latter words could
produce the belief that the investment was backed by the federal
government. 70
b. Names Suggesting the Composition of Fund Portfolios
Many fund names can lead investors to assume that the portfolios of
the funds emphasize certain types of securities or certain types of issu-
ers. For example, the name "Convertible Bond Fund" signifies a port-
folio consisting mainly of convertible bonds, the name "Large Cap
Stock Fund" indicates a portfolio devoted primarily to equities of issu-
ers with the highest market capitalizations, and the name "Real Estate
Securities Fund" suggests a portfolio comprised chiefly of securities of
issuers that develop, own and/or manage real property. Unfortu-
nately, however, the expectations that fund names have produced re-
garding fund portfolios have not always been warranted even though
the expectations were reasonable. The problem seems to have arisen
when names were based on marketing considerations and were se-
lected either by ignoring, or by failing to understand, the investment
character of the funds. 7'
Of course, not all fund names connote a particular type of portfolio
security or issuer, but when a fund has a name with such a connota-
tion, what proportion of its assets should be invested in the indicated
67. Wright Investors' Service, SEC No-Action Letter (March 14, 1974), 1974 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1785.
68. Ben Franklin Thrift Shares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 1, 1973) 1973 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 168.
69. National Securities & Research Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 21, 1974), 1974 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1331.
70. Generic Comment Letter, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 25, 1990), 1990 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1413. The staff indicated that section 35(a) as well as section 35(d) would be violated by
the word combination.
Because of the word "safe," a proposed fund could not be named "The First Safe Fund." The
First Safe Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 9, 1972), 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 159. The staff
concluded that both section 35(d) and section 35(a) would be breached: Section 35(d) would be
violated because the word "safe" implied safety both of the amount invested and of the return
on the investment; section 35(a) would be violated because the portfolio of the fund would
include government and municipal bonds and the word "safe" therefore implied the fund carried
a government guarantee.
71. Amy Dunkin & Jeff Laderman, Fundspeak: A Crash Course, Bus. WK., March 22, 1993,
at 96.
[Vol. 3:345
2005] THE REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUND NAMES 365
type of security or issuer? The question concerned the Commission
under the original version of section 35(d), i.e., before the section was
revised in 1996. Specifically, in 1972, the staff set the minimum at
eighty percent when a given type of security or industry is suggested
by a fund name, i.e., a name that suggests the fund will invest in a type
of security or issuer was required to commit at least eighty percent of
its assets to that type of security or issuer.72 In 1983, the staff partially
modified its position for open-end funds. While the eighty percent
minimum was maintained for money market and tax-exempt funds,
the minimum for other kinds of open-end funds with names indicating
portfolio emphases on particular types of securities or industries was
reduced to sixty-five percent. 73 Although these requirements were
formally suspended in 1998, they continued to be used by the staff
when reviewing registration statements of open-end funds.74 The re-
quirements were replaced in 2002 by the standards in Rule 35d-1 (dis-
cussed infra).
Further applications of section 35(d), prior to its revision in 1996,
involved staff decisions on words in fund names. The staff concluded
that:
* A fund with the word "balanced" in its name must devote at least
twenty-five percent of its assets to fixed-income senior
securities. 75
* A fund whose name employs the noun "capitalization" (or "cap")
preceded by the adjective "small," "mid," or "large" must commit
at least sixty-five percent of its assets to securities of the type
named and must state in its prospectus the criterion it employs to
establish the level of market capitalization. 76
" A fund identifying a country in its name must invest at least sixty-
five percent of its assets in that country. 77
" A minimum of sixty-five percent of the assets of a fund is ex-
pected to be devoted to issuers in three or more nations when the
fund name contains the word "international," "global" or
"world." The United States cannot be one of the nations when
72. Guidelines for the Preparation of Form N-8B-1, Investment Company Act Release No.
7,221, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,790 (June 9, 1972), 1972 SEC LEXIS 1494, at *5.
73. Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies; Guidelines,
Investment Company Act Release No. IC-13436, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,928, at app. B (Aug. 22, 1983).
74. Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment
Company Act Release No. IC-23064, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916, 13,940 (March 23, 1998); Release No.
IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8510 n.6.
75. Guidelines for the Preparation of Form N-8B-1, supra note 72, at *35.
76. Registrant, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 25, 1994), 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 470, at *11.
77. Generic Comment Letter, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 3, 1991), 1991 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1451, at *8.
No detailed criteria were furnished, however, as to the nature or the magnitude of the ties that
must exist between the country and the issuers whose securities are in the portfolio of the fund.
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the word "international" is in the name but can be when either
"global" or "world" is in the name. 78
The Commission decisions reviewed to this point were made under
the original version of section 35(d), i.e., the version adopted in 1940.
In 1996, Congress amended the 1940 version of the section, and in
doing so, it conferred rulemaking authority on the Commission to im-
plement the statutory ban on materially deceptive and misleading
names.79 We therefore turn to the rule the Commission has promul-
gated under the current version of section 35(d).
c. Rule 35d-1
At the present time, just one rule - Rule 35d-1 80 - has been
adopted to implement amended section 35(d), and the Rule, which
supersedes prior inconsistent Commission decisions, can apply to any
investment company that is registered with the Commission. Thus,
the name of an open-end fund, as well as the name of a closed-end
fund and a unit investment trust, can be governed by the Rule. How-
ever, while any registered investment company may find that its name
is within the scope of the Rule, a name will be affected by the Rule
only if the name suggests that the portfolio of the company, the com-
pany itself, or the securities issued by the company possess certain
characteristics. In the words of the Commission: "Investment compa-
nies are not required to adopt names that describe their investment
policies. Those investment companies that do not adopt such a name
are not subject to the [Rule]." 81 Nonetheless, more than four out of
five registered investment companies were estimated by the Commis-
sion to have names covered by the Rule.82
Rule 35d-1 requires that "in normal circumstances" a registered in-
vestment company must have no less than eighty percent of the value
of its portfolio assets83 in, as applicable, (1) the "particular type of
investment" or "particular industry or group of industries" indicated
by the name of the company; or (2) investments that are "tied eco-
78. Id.
79. See the paragraph in the text that accompanies notes 46 to 48 supra.
80. 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2004). The Rule was proposed in 1997. Investment Company
Names, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24828, 62 Fed. Reg. 10, 955 (March 10, 1997).
The final version of the Rule was announced in 2001, and investment companies covered by the
Rule were required to comply with it no later than July 31, 2002. Release No. IC-24828, supra
note 9, at 8514.
81. Release No. IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8511.
82. Id., at 8517 n.63.
83. Under the Rule, "assets" are the total of net assets and any borrowed amounts intended
for investment. 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-l(d)(2) (2004).
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nomically" to the country or region identified by the name of the com-
pany. Furthermore, an investment company whose name suggests its
distributions are exempt from federal income tax, or from federal and
state income tax, normally must have eighty percent or more of the
value of its assets in investments that generate income exempt from
the tax(es) identified or must own investments eighty percent or more
of the income from which is exempt from the tax(es) identified. Fi-
nally, a name is impermissible if it indicates that either the investment
company or the securities issued by the investment company are
"guaranteed, sponsored, recommended, or approved" by the govern-
ment of, or by an agency or instrumentality of, the United States.84
A number of points will aid in understanding the Rule. First, com-
pliance with the Rule does not ensure that a fund name is acceptable
under section 35(d). A particular name may materially deceive or mis-
lead investors, and hence violate section 35(d), even though the port-
folio of the fund using the name has devoted to the type of security or
issuer that is indicated by the name the percentage of assets mandated
by the Rule. For funds whose names subject them to the requirements
of the Rule, in short, adherence to the quantitative standard estab-
lished by the Rule is a necessary condition to satisfy section 35(d), but
conformity with the standard will not in all cases suffice to avoid a
breach of the section. As an illustration, the Commission has stated
that an index fund ought to devote to the index it tracks more than the
percentage of assets set by the Rule as a minimum. 85
Second, insofar as the Rule applies to funds whose names signify a
focus on one or more investment types, industries, nations or geo-
graphic areas, the Rule mandates the acquisition of suitable "invest-
ments" rather than suitable "securities." The word "investments" was
chosen, and the word "securities" was rejected, in formulating the fi-
nal version of the Rule so that a fund could acquire "a synthetic in-
84. 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-l(a) (2004).
A registered investment company whose portfolio securities are based on loans or mortgages
provided by entities that have been chartered or sponsored by Congress (e.g., the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation) may, without violating the Rule, adopt a name that contains a
word suggestive of the U.S. government (e.g., the word "federal" or the word "government")
even though the entities represented in the portfolio, the securities issued by these entities, and
the loans and mortgages underlying the securities issued by theses entities are not backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States. To satisfy the Rule, the investment company must inter
alia devote a minimum of eighty percent of the value of its assets to investments indicated by its
name. In addition, the prospectus of the investment company needs to have a conspicuous,
thorough explanation of the nature of the investments made by the company. Investment Com-
pany Institute, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 17, 2003), 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 729.
85. Release No. IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8511.
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strument in the eighty percent basket if it has economic characteristics
similar to the securities included in that basket.
86
Third, for a fund whose name identifies a nation or geographic re-
gion, the Rule does not list criteria for determining whether invest-
ments are "tied economically" to the nation or region - indeed, the
final version of the Rule omitted three specific criteria that appeared
in the proposed Rule8 7 - and only requires the fund to state in its
prospectus the criteria employed in making this determination.
Fourth, a fund name that specifies a geographic location may be
acceptable under the Rule even though less than eighty percent of the
value of the assets of the fund are devoted to issuers of securities
within that geographic location. The acceptability of such a name
(e.g., a name that specifies the city or state where the fund has its
headquarters) will evidently depend on (1) whether or not the name
was intended to indicate the geographic area in which the fund invests
and (2) whether the name has been in use of a sufficiently long period
that investors understand the portfolio of the fund includes invest-
ments in other locations.88
Fifth, the Rule applies to names that suggest types of investments89
but not to names that indicate investment objectives or investment
strategies. 90 Examples of words or phrases that activate the portfolio
requirements of the Rule - i.e., that designate types of investments
- are "large capitalization," "utilities," and "health care." 91 How-
ever, words such as the preceding that signify types of investments
may be difficult to differentiate from words that signify investment
objectives or strategies. The two categories are not separated by a line
that is readily visible and easily drawn in all cases. For a fund name
containing a particular word or phrase, the category that is appropri-
ate for the name may depend on the meaning of other words or
phrases in the name. Accordingly, categorizing a given name - as a
type of investment or as an investment objective or strategy - may
involve considerable uncertainty.
Illustrations of the point in the prior paragraph may be helpful: The
staff has taken the position that the phrase "high yield," when used by
86. Release No. IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8511, 8512. The "synthetic instrument" must none-
theless qualify as a security because an investment company by definition has a portfolio com-
prised of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2000).
87. Release No. IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8512.
88. Id. at 8512 n.22.
89. Id. at 8514.
90. Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 4, 2001), 2001 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 824, at *13-14 [hereinafter ICI Letter].
91. Id. at *10; Release No. IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8510.
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itself, signifies a type of investment (viz., bonds whose credit quality is
rated lower than investment grade) but that "high yield," when em-
ployed in conjunction with "tax exempt" or "tax-free," refers to an
investment strategy. More investment-grade than noninvestment-
grade tax-exempt bonds are issued and traded, the staff explained,
and high-yield tax-exempt bond funds therefore traditionally invest in
bonds whose credit quality on average surpasses that of bonds ac-
quired by high-yield taxable bond funds. Since the practice is well
established (and presumably recognized by investors), the term "high
yield" in the name "high-yield tax-free bond fund" indicates the fund
plans to acquire tax-free debt instruments whose yield exceeds that of
other tax-exempt bond funds. In this context, then, the phrase "high
yield tax-free" does not specify a type of investment but, rather, de-
notes an investment objective or strategy.92
Another word whose connotation is dependent on context is "in-
come." In a fund name, "income" can signify an investment objective,
or it can signify a type of investment. Whether a fund name falls into
the former category or into the latter category is determined by the
meaning of other words, if any, that accompany "income" in the
name:
When used by itself, the term "income" in a fund's name generally
suggests that the fund emphasizes the achievement of current in-
come and odes not suggest a type of investment. For example,...
the term "equity income" suggests that a fund focuses its invest-
ments in equities and has an investment objective or strategy of
achieving current income. By contrast, a term such as "fixed in-
come" suggests investment in a particular type of investment ... 93
In sum, a fund name is outside the scope of Rule 35d-1 to the extent
the name points to an investment strategy or objective, and a name is
within the Rule to the extent it contains a word indicating a type of
investment. A further, heretofore unmentioned point must not be
overlooked, however: Even when no word in a name is covered by
the Rule, the name can violate section 35(d). The question of when
such a name breaches the section is raised by the "Dividend Growth
Fund" at a prominent fund family. The words "dividend growth"
would probably not subject the fund name to Rule 35d-1 because the
words seem to express an investment strategy.94 However, while the
name "Dividend Growth Fund" indicates an emphasis on issuers
whose dividends have risen over time, decisions on portfolio securities
92. ICI Letter, supra note 90, at *11-12.
93. Id. at *13-14.
94. See Release No. IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8514.
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by the fund in question have apparently been based on changes in the
earnings, not in the dividends, of issuers. The portfolio manager of
the fund has considered dividends only "to screen companies' finan-
cial health and their 'ability to finance future growth."95
What in section 35(d) permits a breach of the section by a fund
when the name of the fund is outside Rule 35d-1? The first sentence
of section 35(d) prohibits a registered investment company from in-
corporating in its name a word that "the Commission finds" would
materially deceive or mislead investors, and the second sentence of
the section authorizes the Commission to identify such words "by rule,
regulation, or order."' 96 By including the first sentence, Congress re-
quired action by the Commission before a name can be deemed to
violate the section. The second sentence, in listing the actions availa-
ble to the Commission, uses both (1) the singular (i.e., "rule," "regula-
tion," "order") and (2) the disjunctive (i.e., "or"). The phrasing of the
second sentence is unfortunate. If construed literally, the sentence
would severely constrain the Commission and impede its ability to
regulate fund names: The language of the second sentence suggests
that section 35(d) is capable of being implemented by just one rule or
by just one regulation or by just one order.
In securities law, a regulation is normally a set of connected rules,97
and section 35(d), by authorizing a regulation, allows related rules on
fund names to be adopted. The section also furnishes the Commission
with the authority to issue an order dealing with a fund name. Assum-
ing that the exact wording of section 35(d) is followed, a fund with a
name such as the previously mentioned "Dividend Growth Fund" can
violate the section even when the Commission has excluded the name
from Rule 35d-1 - but only if the Commission, having adopted Rule
35d-1, is able to act by order and/or by one or more additional rules
(which may form a regulation). However, since the three forms of
action (rule, regulation, order) that Congress authorized the Commis-
sion to take are expressed in the singular and separated by "or," a
literal interpretation of section 35(d) leads to the conclusion that the
95. Virginia Munger Kahn, The Dividend Gains New Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 3,
at 10.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (2000). The full text of section 35(d) appears in the text accompany-
ing note 47 supra.
97. At least one securities regulation (Regulation CE) consists of a single rule. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.1001 (2004). The designation "CE" was selected for the regulation because it is shorthand
for "coordinated exemptions." Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, Securities Act
Release No. 33-7285, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,356, 21356 n.1 (May 9, 1996). The Commission classified
the one rule as a regulation apparently for the purpose of elevating the rule to parity with an-
other regulation (Regulation D) that, like the rule, exempts transactions from section 5 of the
Securities Act. See id. at 21,357.
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Commission, after promulgating Rule 35d-1, cannot adopt another
rule or issue an order under the section, and may even be precluded
from revising Rule 35d-1: Application of the section as worded re-
stricts the Commission to a single order, to a single rule, or to a single
regulation. Section 35(d) would accordingly prevent a fund name that
is not covered by Rule 35d-1 from being found materially deceptive or
misleading and hence in breach of the section unless the section is
interpreted to allow the Commission to take further actions.
Section 35(d), of course, cannot be construed as it is written. A
construction of the section that conformed to its exact wording would
prevent companion rules from being added to Rule 35dl (perhaps to
create a regulation), but additional rules may be needed in the future
- along with orders to deal with individual cases. Congress, unless it
furnishes a clear indication to the contrary, must be presumed to want
a government agency on which it confers regulatory powers to re-
spond effectively to changed circumstances and unique situations that
are within the concepts in the legislation. Furthermore, because Con-
gress cannot continually revise a statute, the necessity of this presump-
tion has grown over time as change - social, economic and
technological - has intensified and society has become more complex.
Thus, the Act, like securities statutes in general, "must be broadly
construed in order to insure the investing public a full measure of pro-
tection. ' '98 This principal applies to section 35(d) of the Act, since the
legislative history of the section furnishes no reason to believe that
Congress, when it amended the section in 1996, wanted to cabin the
SEC. On the contrary, a congressional committee report on the
amendment that was adopted suggests Congress hoped the amend-
ment would expand Commission efforts to regulate fund names.99
The committee report also explains that the amendment authorizes
the Commission "to adopt rules" governing fund names.100 That the
plural rather than the singular of "rule" was employed indicates that,
in authorizing the Commission to regulate fund names, Congress did
not expect the Commission to act just once.
In the interpretation of a federal statute, the United States Supreme
Court has stressed, "[t]he ultimate question is one of congressional
intent,"' 1 1 and the interpretation of particular words is determined by
98. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 326 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964).
99. See COMMERCE COMM., NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996,
H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 50 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3913.
100. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3879 (italics added).
101. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622. 653 (1988) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
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the purpose of Congress in enacting the statute. 10 2 Available evidence
of legislative intent regarding the 1996 version of section 35(d) indi-
cates that the Commission was given versatile powers to suppress fund
names that can materially deceive or mislead investors, and the word-
ing of the second sentence of the section appears attributable to an
unthinking or ill-judged choice of language. Therefore, Rule 35d-1
need not be the final pronouncement by the Commission on fund
names, and the Commission can, by means of further rules and by
means of orders, take action on names that do not violate Rule 35d-1
and deem them unacceptable under section 35(d).
V. NAMES NOT COVERED BY SECTION 35(D)
Since social capital is a basic aspect of society, another type of fund
name should be considered here. Fund names of this type seem sim-
ply to have been ignored, and because the names are neither materi-
ally deceptive nor materially misleading, section 35(d) does not apply
to them. Such fund names can be denominated "cute" or "catchy,"
and they are adopted by funds for their tendency to be remembered
easily, to attract attention, and/or to evoke favorable imagery. Cute
and catchy names are potentially able to influence, and hence manipu-
late, investors, but they do not distort, hide, or misrepresent their
funds' investment strategies or securities portfolios. Rather, cute and
catchy names simply furnish no information on these matters. As a
result, such names are neither materially deceptive nor misleading,
and are outside the scope of section 35(d) and beyond the authority of
the Commission to regulate.
An understanding of the issue may be aided by four examples of
cute and catchy fund names that have recently been used or that are
currently in use. In alphabetical order, they are:
* "Global Interactive Couch Potato Fund." The Fund, whose name
was changed in January 2000 to "Global Growth Fund," invested
primarily in securities issued by enterprises that supplied technol-
ogy-based products and services for electronic as well as tradi-
tional forms of communications, entertainment, and
publishing.10 3
102. Welch v. Schneider National Bulk Carriers, 676 F. Supp. 571, 575 (D. N.J. 1987).
103. GABELLI GLOBAL SERIES FUNDS, INC., PROSPECTUS (Global Interactive Couch Potato®
Fund) (May 1, 1997), at 5 (on file with author) [hereinafter COUCH POTATO FUND PROSPECTUS];
GABELLI GLOBAL GROWTH FUND, ANNUAL REPORT (Dec. 31, 2003), at 9, http://www.gabelli.
com/funds/products/442.html (last visited Feb.15, 2005). For descriptions of the types of issuers
considered for the portfolio before and after the change in fund name, compare COUCH POTATO
FUND PROSPECTUS, supra, with GABELLI GLOBAL SERIES FUNDS, INC., PROSPECTUS (Global
Growth Fund), at 5 (May 1, 2004), http://www.gabeli.comlfunds/prosps/442.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2005).
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* "Nifty Fifty Fund." The portfolio of the Fund is composed chiefly
of the common stock of roughly fifty "growth" issuers that are
thought to have the greatest potential for long-term capital
appreciation.
10 4
* "Thermostat Fund." The Fund divides essentially all of its assets
between stocks and bonds, with the representation in the portfo-
lio of each type of security determined by a formula that is tied to
the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index: The proportion of the
portfolio devoted to stocks varies inversely with the Index, and
the proportion of the portfolio devoted to bonds varies directly
with the Index. Thus, the representation of stocks automatically
decreases, and the representation of bonds automatically in-
creases, as the Index rises. 10 5 The goal of the Thermostat Fund,
according to its fund family, is to provide a simple, continuously
operating mechanism by which securities investors can deal with
"hot and cold markets" 10 6 and anticipate reversals in the direc-
tion of securities prices.
" "Vice Fund." The Fund invests mainly in equity securities issued
by businesses that derive at least one-fourth of their income
"from products often considered socially irresponsible." Gam-
bling, liquor, tobacco, and weapons/defense are expressly identi-
fied by the Fund as industries appropriate for its portfolio.
10 7
104. ENGEMANN ASSET MANAGEMENT, PROSPECTUS (Phoenix-Engemann Nifty Fifty Fund)
(May 1, 2004), at 1, http://www.phoenixinvestments.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
105. COLUMBIA THERMOSTAT FUND, PROSPECTUS (March 1, 2003), at 2-3 (on file with
author).
106. Martha Graybow, U.S. Fund Firms Try to Woo Back Investors, YAHOO! NEWS (March 6,
2003) (on file with author).
107. VICE FUND, PROSPECTUS (Aug. 15, 2002), at 1 (on file with the author) [hereinafter VICE
FUND PROSPECTUS].
The Fund has committed itself to investing eighty percent of its net assets (under normal
market conditions) in equities of issuers that provide "socially irresponsible" products or ser-
vices. Id. at 2. The Fund will thus comply with Rule 35d-1, but a persuasive argument can be
made that the Fund is not required to do so because its name does not come under the Rule.
The pertinent provision of Rule 35d-1 is paragraph (a)(2), which applies to "a name suggesting
that the Fund focuses its investments .. .in a particular industry or group of industries." 17
C.F.R. § 270.35d-l(a)(2)(2004). Two words in paragraph (a)(2) -viz., "suggesting" and "partic-
ular" - determine whether the Vice Fund is covered. In the context of the paragraph, "suggest"
means "to call up the thought of [a thing] by association or natural connexion of ideas," and
"particular" means "pertaining or relating to a single definite thing ... or set of things, as distin-
guished from others." 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 142 (2d ed. 1989); 11 OXFORD EN-
GLISH DICTIONARY 270 (2d ed. 1989). A name therefore "suggests" a "particular" referent only
if the members of society generally associate the name with that referent. Since numerous indus-
tries may be deemed "socially irresponsible," the scope of Vice Fund investments is unclear: The
activities that are denominated "vice" in a society differ between groups and change over time,
because the referents of "vice" vary with social values. Indeed, the prospectus of the Vice Fund
states that its list of industries (gambling, liquor, tobacco, and weapons/defense) is "not exclu-
sive." VICE FUND PROSPECTUS, supra, at 1. The Fund thus acknowledges that the list can include
other industries. However, a fund name is unlikely to "suggest[ ] ... investments in a particular
... group of industries" -i.e., a fund name is unlikely to be covered by paragraph (a)(2) -
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The Vice Fund merits further examination. The Fund, an open-end
investment company, began seeking investors publicly in August 2002
and promptly attracted the attention of the broadcast and print media.
In less than four months, the Fund pointed out in a letter to its share-
holders, "[t]he Fund has been featured in Time Magazine, The Wall
Street Journal, Investor's Business Daily, Financial Times, Barron's,
SmartMoney Magazine, Business 2.0 Magazine, The New York Times,
and many others. It has also been on ABC News Good Morning
America, MSNBC, CNNfn, Bloomberg TV, Bloomberg Radio, and
BBC Radio. 108
Interest in the Fund on the part of the mass media is notable, be-
cause in 2002, open-end mutual funds that invest in equities exper-
ienced net redemptions for the first time in fourteen years;
specifically, net redemptions from open-end equity funds in 2002
amounted to roughly $28 billion.10 9 However, the disenchantment
with equities on the part of numerous investors did not seem to curb
the attention paid to the Vice Fund by the broadcast and print media
or, presumably, by some segments of the public. Given investor dis-
satisfaction at this time with equities in general, 110 the media and pub-
lic notice of the Vice Fund is probably explainable in part by the name
of the Fund. Since the publicity garnered by the Fund may have in-
creased, and almost certainly did not decrease, the number of its in-
vestors, the Fund unquestionably chose a name that was advantageous
to it.
Whether an investment company benefits from its name, however,
is not relevant or important to the purpose of section 35(d). The criti-
cal role of social capital in a society requires that, with regard to fund
names and other matters, the interests of investment companies must
be secondary to the interests of the public. Section 35(d) forbids cer-
tain types of fund names - viz., names that are found by the Commis-
sion to be materially deceptive or misleading - because the public
welfare is damaged by such names and Congress responded accord-
unless the name readily identifies the industries it encompasses. The referents of the name "Vice
Fund" appear too uncertain to subject the name to Rule 35d-1.
108. VICE FUND PROSPECTUS (Sept. 30, 2002), at 3 (on file with author) [hereinafter VICE
FUND REPORT]. The subscription period for Vice Fund shares started on August 15, 2002 and
continued to August 30, 2002. See "Subscription Period Note" in VICE FUND PROSPECTUS, supra
note 107. The Fund commenced operations on August 30, 2002, and the letter to shareholders is
dated November 29, 2002. VICE FUND REPORT, supra, at 3, 10.
109. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 118.
110. For example, a national survey conducted in November 2002 asked a sample of adults
having "investable assets" of at least $10,000 whether stocks or bonds were "more promising
right now" as investments. Just 29% of respondents favored stocks. Roper Center, Public Opin-
ion Online, accession no. 419511 (LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File).
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ingly. Since cute and catchy names do not deceive or mislead inves-
tors, they are currently permissible under section 35(d), but whether
they ought to remain outside the section merits discussion.
Should Congress rewrite section 35(d) and ban cute and catchy
names? The question is not easily answered, because an answer re-
quires a choice between two strongly held cultural values in the
United States - on the one hand, that persons should be protected
when they are unable to take care of themselves; and on the other
hand, that individuals should accept the consequences of their deci-
sions unless the decisions stemmed from fraud, duress, or undue influ-
ence.111 In terms of whether cute and catchy names ought to be
forbidden by law, these values directly conflict and lead to opposite
conclusions. According to the first value, law should prohibit cunning
organizers of an investment vehicle from exploiting investors who are,
by virtue of their intellectual ability or training, incapable of protect-
ing themselves from economic injury. According to the second value,
however, law should not place restrictions on conduct about which
individuals can acquire complete and accurate information. In the lat-
ter situation, individuals are able to shield themselves from economic
harm, and the second value imposes a responsibility on them to do so.
The result of the conflict between the two values may be indecision
regarding whether to revise section 35(d). However, if American soci-
ety is to operate effectively, the conflict cannot be permitted to thwart
action that safeguards social capital - and, where necessary and pos-
sible, action that strengthens it. Investment companies, especially mu-
tual funds, are too important to the financial well-being of Americans,
and practices should therefore not be legally permissible if they dam-
age the confidence and trust of the public. Assuming that an amend-
ment of section 35(d) is warranted because cute and catchy names
cause such damage - a question that cannot be answered until suitable
empirical research is done - what should be substituted for the current
version of the section?
To prohibit cute and catchy names, section 35(d) could be rewritten
to identify explicitly such names or a generic class that includes such
names. Doing so, of course, would pattern the section on its present
version in that value-based concepts would continue to be employed.
The key concepts of the current section- "deceiving" and "mislead-
ing" - implicate social values held by Americans: Deceptive and
111. Undue influence is defined as "unfair persuasion" of a person by another person (1)
when the latter dominates the former or (2) when the former is reasonable in assuming that the
latter, given the nature of their relationship, will not intentionally jeopardize his/her welfare.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1) (1981).
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misleading activities are inconsistent with ideals in the United States,
and even if these activities escape punishment by the legal system,
they are disapproved socially.112 The section could be amended to
prohibit names that are "materially manipulative," a term that can
cover not only cute and catchy names but also names that are materi-
ally deceptive or misleading. Written in this way, however, section
35(d) would continue to utilize a concept (i.e., "manipulative") having
distinct value connotations. 113
Section 35(d) may preserve and enhance social capital more effec-
tively if it assesses the acceptability of fund names with a criterion that
focuses on reactions to the names by potential investors. Specifically, a
name would be illegal under the revised section if the name by itself
substantially increases the percentage of potential investors who in-
vest in the fund that uses the name. The preceding criterion would be
both more encompassing and more precise. The present standard for
section 35(d) would be included in, but would only be a part of, the
proposed standard: A materially deceptive or misleading fund name
could be expected to enlarge unacceptably the fraction of potential
investors who become fund investors, and a cute or catchy name
could, too. Moreover, the proposed revision would furnish a standard
of greater precision, since it would be measured in quantitative units
of one-hundred (assuming decimals are not used).
Let me more fully explain the substitute standard with three points.
First, the standard for the legality of a fund name under section 35(d)
as revised would be whether the name per se raises the probability of
an investment in the fund by one-fourth or more. A fund name would
be illegal when ceteris paribus the name produces investments in the
fund by a number of investors that is at least twenty-five percent
larger than the number that would invest if the fund had a benign
name, i.e., a name that did no more than (accurately) describe the
112. Deceptive conduct and misleading conduct constitute dishonesty. The rejection of dis-
honesty in American society is indicated by data from two surveys of national samples of adults:
A survey conducted in 1994 found that ninety-nine percent of respondents believed that "good
character" requires a person to be honest. A survey conducted in 1987 reported that ninety-four
percent of respondents considered honesty in another person to be "extremely important" for
that person to be "a friend." Roper Center, Public Opinion Online, accession nos. 224480,
112473 (LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File).
113. The definition of "manipulate" includes "to manage by dexterous contrivance or influ-
ence; esp. to treat unfairly or insidiously for one's own advantage." 9 OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 319 (2d ed. 1989). Social values are necessarily involved in judgments that a particular
result or process is unfair or insidious. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 637 (1991) (determi-
nations of fairness require an examination of "history and wide practice as guides to fundamen-
tal values"); 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 13 (2d ed.1989) (definition of "unfair"); 7
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1026 (2d ed.1989) (definition of "insidious").
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nature of the portfolio.114 The standard would accordingly be con-
cerned with the effect of the name on investor behavior and not with
the purpose of those who selected the name. Second, "potential in-
vestors" under the standard would be persons who, regardless of their
level of formal education (years of school), have little or no knowl-
edge about investing in securities and/or little or no ability to analyze
particular securities investments.115 The preservation of social capital
requires that law on this topic be concerned with, to quote the SEC,
"the effect which the name may have not only on the sophisticated
and informed investor, but also on the unwary and the ignorant."'
116
Third, whether a name satisfies the standard would be determined by
well-designed empirical research, not speculation, on how potential
investors respond to the name. Since the standard would deem a fund
name unlawful only if the name increased by a minimum of one-
fourth the number of persons who become investors in the fund, the
standard necessitates quantitative behavioral science research the data
from which are analyzed with a multivariate statistical technique (e.g.,
multiple regression). Decisions by the judiciary or by the Commission
on whether a particular fund name is lawful would not be grounded in
the fictitious "reasonable" person,1 7 because decisions based on the
"reasonable" person cannot empirically establish (1) the percentage
of potential investors who would decide to invest in a fund if the fund
used a particular name, (2) the percentage of potential investors who
would decide to invest in the fund if another, innocuous name were
used, and (3) the difference between the former and latter percent-
114. A different percentage can be selected, of course, but twenty-five percent is not unrea-
sonable. If one-hundred investors would be obtained by a fund with a benign name, the name
that is in question would violate the revision of section 35(d) if the name produced one-hundred
and twenty-five or more investors.
The standard might be stated either in percentages or in percentage points, but percentages are
more equitable since the relative impact of a particular number of percentage points varies (in-
versely) with the size of the percentage that is the base from which the change occurs. The
proposed revision of section 35(d) would thus determine the acceptability of a fund name in
terms of increases in percentages and not in terms of increases in percentage points.
115. Such investors are thus the antithesis of persons to whom an issuer can offer unregistered
securities under the private placement exemption of section 4(2) of the Securities Act. See
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.24[1] (4th ed. 2002).
116. In the Matter of Civil and Military Investors Mutual Fund, Inc., Investment Company
Act Release No. 2723 [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J 76,595, at 50,298,
50,299 (June 9, 1958), available at 1958 SEC LEXIS 405.
117. The "reasonable person" standard has a long history, apparently entering Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence in 1837. Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1979) (attributing to Vaughan
v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837), the first use of the term "reasonable man of ordinary
prudence"). Since the "reasonable person" standard is firmly established in American law, con-
siderable resistance can be expected to replacing it with a different standard.
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ages. 118 Decisions on a fund name would instead be determined using
quantitative data that are obtained by observing the behavior of po-
tential investors and that are analyzed with rigorous statistical tests
capable of estimating the impact of the fund name.
The type of research that might be conducted to ascertain whether a
fund name meets the proposed standard can be illustrated with the
following: Assume that an investment company named the "Home-
land Securities Fund" is planned and that it will acquire both equities
and bonds with the stated purpose of producing an increase in capital
and a moderate amount of income. Further assume that, under nor-
mal market conditions, the Fund will devote a minimum of half of its
assets to issuers that are based in the United States and the remainder
of its assets to issuers that are based outside the United States but that
derive more than half of their revenues from business operations in
the United States. Finally, assume that all of the securities in the port-
folio of the Fund will be either registered with the SEC or acquired
and sold in transactions that, although occurring in the United States,
do not necessitate registration of the securities.
Given the nature of the hypothetical investment company, a benign
name for the company would be "Growth and Income Fund." The
latter name would not be governed by Rule 35d-1 because it signifies
an investment objective.11 9 The name "Homeland Securities Fund"
would also not be subject to the Rule unless, as seems unlikely, the
name is construed as suggesting that the portfolio will consist of in-
vestments that are "tied economically" to the United States. 20 More-
over, apart from Rule 35d-1, the name "Homeland Securities Fund"
would be acceptable under section 35(d) - i.e., would not be deceptive
or misleading - because the composition of the portfolio would be
consistent with the name. 121 In short, the name "Homeland Securities
Fund" would not be encompassed by section 35(d) as currently
worded and implemented. However, given the establishment of the
federal Office, and then the federal Department, of Homeland Secur-
118. In all but clear-cut cases applying the "reasonable person" standard, juries rather than
judges are responsible for deciding how a reasonable investor would have behaved. TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). Among the difficulties posed by the rea-
sonable person standard is that jurors (and judges) are unlikely to be representative of investors
in their states, let alone of investors in the nation as a whole.
119. ICI Letter, supra note 90, at *14.
120. 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-l(a)(3) (2004). Even if the name were so construed, however, the
Fund would easily be able to satisfy the Rule, which only requires an investment company whose
name identifies a country or geographic region to include in its prospectus a statement of the
criteria it will use in choosing investments. Id.
121. Release No. IC-24828, supra note 9, at 8514.
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ity,122 the concept of "Homeland Security" could carry over to the
words "Homeland Securities" in the name of the fund. Thus, because
of its name, the Homeland Securities Fund could attract investors who
believe the net asset value of Fund shares will not be depressed by
acts of terrorism and/or will be raised by spending to combat
terrorism.
If the suggested change is made in section 35(d), a registered invest-
ment company that plans to call itself the "Homeland Securities
Fund" or use another name that is not neutral would be responsible
for paying the cost of research to prove that the name increases the
number of investors by less than twenty-five percent over a benign
name that would be suitable for the fund. 12 3 The research, which
would be conducted by a qualified behavioral scientist who has no ties
to the investment company, may include a study in which data are
obtained from individuals who come to the investigators' worksite (a
"laboratory" study); if a prohibited effect is found and the investment
company still wanted to use the proposed name, a survey of a sample
of individuals drawn from a broader population would be needed.
The two research designs may yield different results. The former
places the participants who are being studied in an environment that,
for them, is artificial, and the findings of the study may not accurately
reflect the behavior of potential investors in their normal settings.
Nonetheless, a laboratory study may possess the ability to determine
the maximum effect of a particular name, and if the maximum is
found to be less than twenty-five percent, a survey (which can be ex-
pected to cost substantially more) might not be necessary. On the
other hand, if the laboratory study indicated that a name will raise the
number of investors by twenty-five percent or more, a sample survey
would be required of potential investors in the geographic area(s)
and/or demographic group(s) that will be targeted in the marketing
efforts of the fund. A survey, by obtaining data from potential inves-
tors in a setting (e.g., their homes) where they are exposed to many
familiar stimuli, may yield an estimate of investor response to a fund
name that is lower than the estimate derived from research carried out
122. The Office of Homeland Security was created in 2001 by Executive Order No. 13,228, 66
Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001). The Department of Homeland Security was created by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which Act became effective January 2003. Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
123. The SEC could develop a list of neutral names that can serve as a base for ascertaining
the increase in the number of investors who would attracted by the name in question. An invest-
ment company whose name was on the list would not need to conduct the research being de-
scribed. Only an investment company whose name was not on the list would be required to
undertake the research.
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in a setting that is artificial for the participants. 124 If so, the survey
estimate could determine the acceptability of the name.
Written standards to serve as guidelines for the research - stan-
dards approved by the SEC - may be prudent in order to ensure
studies of high quality. Aspects of the research that may be appropri-
ate for written standards are (1) the population studied, (2) the sam-
pling procedure utilized, and (3) the proportion of individuals in the
sample from whom data are acquired. Standards for these aspects
would increase the likelihood that the results of the research can be
generalized to a universe that is definable, larger, and pertinent.
Thus, a survey ought to apply a form of probability sampling to a spec-
ifiable, broad and relevant population, and ought to obtain data from
a high percentage of the individuals in the sample. 125 While
probability sampling and a large population will almost always be im-
practical for a laboratory study, the procedure by which individuals
are included in such a study must not generate participants who
choose themselves. Unfortunately, laboratory studies seem typically
to be performed with participants who happen to be available and
who are therefore generally self-selected. These participants, how-
ever, are very likely to possess attributes that are absent in individuals
not in the study and that can affect the behavior(s) of interest. In
laboratory research, therefore, some procedure for obtaining partici-
pants is needed in order to furnish confidence that the findings of the
research are applicable to a substantial group of potential investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has explored one section of the Investment Company
Act, but its approach is applicable generally to legislation and admin-
istrative agency rules promulgated for legislation. I have suggested
that, in formulating and evaluating statutes and agency rules, the legal
system would more effectively serve the interests of society if it drew
on concepts and empirical research in the social and behavioral sci-
ences. Whether due to inertia and/or to a lack of information, how-
124. Compare Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electo-
rate?, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 829, 833 (1994) with Stephen D. Ansolabehere et al., Replicating
Experiments Using Aggregate and Survey Data: The Case of Negative Advertising and Turnout,
93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 901, 904 (1999) (laboratory experiment on election campaign advertising
found that both positive advertising and negative advertising affected expressed voting inten-
tions, but sample surveys revealed no impact from positive advertising).
125. Probability sampling includes different types of sampling procedures in which every
member of the population being studied has a known, nonzero chance of being chosen for the
sample. Simple random sampling - popularly known as "random sampling" - is one form of
probability sampling. EARL R. BABBIE, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 91-106 (1973).
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ever, participants in the legal system infrequently take advantage of
other disciplines. 126 The problem extends to, and may be in part
caused by, law schools in the United States: Few law school courses
demand the study of the social and behavioral sciences, and the schol-
arship of law school faculty members commonly disregards or misun-
derstands the methodological aspects, statistical techniques, and
findings of empirical research conducted in these disciplines.127 Ac-
cordingly, even if a large proportion of legislators were law school
graduates, 128 regulatory law would be unlikely to make use of the so-
cial and behavioral sciences.
Law is a vehicle that serves the needs of society, and since social life
requires trust in others, 129 law must preserve and promote trust.130
Unfortunately, this simple but essential sociological concept - trust -
seems to be acknowledged in the legal profession only in the context
of publicly salient scandals such as those that have occurred in the
business sector during the last few years. The legal criteria that are
currently applicable to the names of mutual funds - "materially de-
ceptive," "materially misleading," and "reasonable person" - arise
from and endorse widely held social values; by embodying such val-
ues, the criteria reinforce trust in society and hence the commitment
of individuals to society. Nonetheless, the same ends might be at-
tained more fully and/or more efficiently with an alternative ap-
proach, and the social and behavioral sciences may suggest such an
approach.
The criteria that presently determine the acceptability of fund
names are highly subjective, and they are therefore difficult to apply
in a coherent manner. However, the legal system, to be regarded as
126. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L. J. 137, 145 (1990).
127. Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The
Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv 1 (2002).
128. The vast majority of legislators are at the state and local level. Data from the National
Conference of State Legislatures indicate that only about one in six state legislators is a lawyer,
but the proportion of state legislators who hold a law degree, while unknown, is higher. George
B. Shepherd, Defending the Aristocracy: ABA Accreditation and the Filtering of Political Leaders,
12 CORNELL J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 637, 663 n.108 (2003).
129. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST (1995).
130. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that fairness in the conduct of
government (including statutes and the behavior of government officers and employees) is a
"fundamental principle" mandated by the federal Constitution. E.g., Butz v.Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 495 (1978). A belief in the fairness of government appears generally to be an antece-
dent or component of trust in society. Cf. J. Barton Cunningham & James MacGregor,Trust and
the Design of Work: Complementary Constructs in Satisfaction and Performance, 53 HUM. REL.
1575 (2000) (perceptions by individuals of the fairness of the management of their group is an
element of trust, which affects satisfaction with and commitment to the group).
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fair, must employ its standards consistently - or, at least, must be
widely thought to employ its standards consistently.131 As a result,
current criteria for fund names possess a disadvantage that should not
be ignored. The standard proposed in this article is more likely to be
deemed fair and serve the interests of society, because the proposed
standard would not depend on subjective criteria. Rather, the pro-
posed standard would employ a fixed quantitative criterion and re-
quire quantitative data, gathered through well-designed studies, on
the reactions of investors.
In this regard, "cute" and "catchy" fund names expose a defect in
section 35(d) as currently worded. Cute and catchy names have the
potential to attract many investors for whom the named funds are in-
appropriate, but these names are presently outside the scope of sec-
tion 35(d) because the prohibition of the section is limited to fund
names that are materially deceptive or misleading. If section 35(d) is
revised, a revision that incorporates the standard suggested in this ar-
ticle would, by avoiding subjective criteria, permit greater consistency
of application. The proposed standard would not be entirely free of
uncertainty and disagreement - scientific methods never are - but
the degree of uncertainty and the frequency of disagreement would be
reduced by it. The proposed standard would thus promote percep-
tions of fairness, increase trust, and allow the legal system more effec-
tively to preserve the social order.
131. E.g., In re Ingersoll, 710 N.E. 2d 390, 397 (Ill. 1999); United States v. Hamilton, 708 F.2d
1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1983).
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